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ABSTRACT
The American criminal justice system is at a turning point. For decades,
as the rate of incarceration exploded, observers of the American criminal jus-
tice system criticized the enormous discretion wielded by key actors, particu-
larly police and prosecutors, and the lack of empirical evidence that has
informed that discretion. Since the 1967 President's Commission on Law En-
forcement and Administration of Justice report, The Challenge of Crime in a
Free Society, there has been broad awareness that the criminal system lacks
empirically informed approaches. That report unsuccessfully called for a na-
tional research strategy with an independent national criminal justice research
institute, along the lines of the National Institutes of Health. Following the
report, police agencies continued to base their practices on conventional wis-
dom or "tried-and-true" methods. Prosecutors retained broad discretion, rely-
ing on their judgment as lawyers and elected officials. Lawmakers enacted
new criminal statutes, largely reacting to the politics of crime and not empiri-
cal evidence concerning what measures make for effective crime control.
Judges interpreted traditional constitutional criminal procedure rules in defer-
ence to the exercise of discretion by each of these actors. Very little data existed
to test what worked for police or prosecutors, or to protect individual defend-
ants' rights. Today, criminal justice actors are embracing more data-driven
approaches. This raises new opportunities and challenges. A deep concern is
whether the same institutional arrangements that produced mass incarceration
will use data collection to maintain the status quo. Important concerns remain
with relying on data, selectively produced and used by officials and analyzed
in nontransparent ways, without sufficient review by the larger research and
policy community. Efforts to evaluate research in a systematic and interdisci-
plinary fashion in the field of medicine offer useful lessons for criminal justice.
This Essay explores the opportunities and concerns raised by a law, policy,
and research agenda for an evidence-informed criminal justice system.
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INTRODUCTION
In the fifty years since the 1967 President's Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice report, The Challenge of
Crime in a Free Society ("Report"),' awareness has only grown that
the criminal justice system lacks empirically informed approaches.
That Report noted, "Few domestic social problems more seriously
threaten our welfare or exact a greater toll on our resources," and yet
"[w]e need to know much more about crime." 2 The Report called for
a national research strategy with an independent national criminal jus-
tice research institute, along the lines of the National Institutes of
Health. The Report emphasized that, rather than adopt evidence-in-
formed approaches, "society has relied primarily on traditional an-
swers and has looked almost exclusively to common sense and hunch
for needed changes."3
In the decades that followed, lawmakers and courts further rein-
forced deference to "traditional answers" uninformed by empirical
data. Police typically deployed and trained officers based on what was
traditionally done, not based on research. Prosecutors made charging
decisions based on their policies and priorities, not based on empirical
data. The interdisciplinary scientific research enterprise that the 1967
President's Commission had called for never materialized. Legislation
expanded funding for criminal justice research, but through the De-
partment of Justice, not an independent scientific entity.4 Policymak-
1 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAw ENF'T & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF
CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (1967).
2 Id. at 273, 279.
3 Id. at 273.
4 See Daniel S. Nagin, Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century, in 42 CRIME AND JUSTICE
IN AMERICA, 1975-2025, at 199, 203 (Michael Tonry ed., 2013); Michael Tonry, Evidence, Ideol-
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ers continued to disregard research showing that tough-on-crime
policies were largely not working.5 Meanwhile, a series of decisions by
the Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts eroded the constitutional
protections afforded to criminal defendants. 6 Those judicial decisions
enhanced the traditional discretion of police and prosecutors, while
creating exceptions to exclusionary rules and limiting civil remedies,
and state and federal legislators enacted tough-on-crime laws and sen-
tencing guidelines that ushered in an era of plea bargaining and mass
incarceration.7
Far from being evidence-based, the politics of criminal justice
were said to be irredeemably "pathological" and incapable of being
addressed in the courts or legislatures.8 The criminal justice system
had collapsed-or, more accurately, it had metastasized. In his 2001
article, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, William Stuntz ob-
served, without much hope that change was possible, that the tough-
on-crime era might be receding, but if the same institutional structures
persisted, then police and prosecutors would continue to dominate
criminal justice.9
As those indictments were uttered, change was underway, largely
at the local level, but not in constitutional criminal procedure, which is
most visible and subject to academic commentary.10 Data-driven ap-
proaches may support these changes or create new concerns and chal-
lenges. As crime, including violent crime, continues to fall"-
ogy, and Politics in the Making of American Criminal Justice Policy, in 42 CRIME AND JUSTICE IN
AMERICA, 1975-2025, supra, at 1, 1-2.
5 See Tonry, supra note 4, at 5.
6 See, e.g., Stephen A. Saltzburg, Foreword: The Flow and Ebb of Constitutional Criminal
Procedure in the Warren and Burger Courts, 69 GEo. L.J. 151, 208 (1980); Louis Michael Seid-
man, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An Examination of Continuity and Change in Criminal
Procedure, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 436, 436 (1980); Tom Stacy, The Search for the Truth in Constitu-
tional Criminal Procedure, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1369, 1450 (1991); Carol S. Steiker, Counter-
Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L.
REV. 2466, 2468 (1996).
7 See Saltzburg, supra note 6, at 157-58.
8 See generally William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L.
REV. 505, 510-11, 529-39 (2002).
9 See id. at 510 ("The current tough-on-crime phase of our national politics will someday
end; indeed it seems to be ending already, as the current controversies over the death penalty
and racial profiling suggest.").
10 For a cogent and prescient call for empiricism in constitutional criminal procedure spe-
cifically, see Tracey L. Meares & Bernard E. Harcourt, Foreword: Transparent Adjudication and
Social Science Research in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
733, 735, 743 (2000) (calling "for a new generation of criminal procedure jurisprudence, one that
places empirical and social scientific evidence at the very heart of constitutional adjudication").
11 AMES C. GRAWERT & JAMES CULLEN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, CRIME IN 2017 1-2
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although budget pressures on state and local government remain12 -
criminal justice reforms designed to reduce reliance on incarceration
have increased in momentum.1 3 Incarceration rates, which reached re-
cord levels with increased prison populations every year from 1970 to
2007, began to decline modestly in 2008.14 Efforts to reduce reliance
on incarceration are increasingly bipartisan.15 Lawmakers are not sim-
ply seeking cost savings.16 Lawmakers and policymakers are beginning
to rely more on evidence-informed methods not only to achieve public
safety and reduce incarceration, but also to improve the quality of evi-
dence used in courtrooms, to improve policing through technology,
and to gather better data on criminal justice operations.' The ques-
tion that this Essay addresses is whether and how such efforts, focus-
ing on those that seek to rely on data, can work lasting change in the
criminal justice system.
At each stage of the criminal justice process, actors increasingly
use evidence-informed practices. Evidence-informed practices refer to
a family of approaches that have brought greater use of data and sci-
ence into the criminal justice system.' These reforms have occurred
through collaborations between local government, police, probation
(2017), https://www.brennancenter.org/press-release/new-data-crime-and-murder-down-2017
[https://perma.cc/X2TX-33DN].
12 See Mary D. Fan, Beyond Budget-Cut Criminal Justice: The Future of Penal Law, 90
N.C. L. REV. 581, 583 (2012).
13 See Charlie Savage, Trend to Lighten Harsh Sentences Catches On in Conservative
States, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/13/us/13penal.html [https://
perma.cc/QME6-7U6Z].
14 See, e.g., LAUREN E. GLAZE & DANIELLE KAEBLE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2013, at 2 (2014),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpusl3.pdf [https://perma.cc/M7LX-6PEK]; SENTENCING
PROJECT, TRENDS IN U.S. CORRECTIONS 1 (2018), https://sentencingproject.org/wp-content/
uploads/2016/01/Trends-in-US-Corrections.pdf [https://perma.cc/QN6E-6WLL].
15 See Newt Gingrich & Pat Nolan, Prison Reform: A Smart Way for States to Save Money
and Lives, WASH. POST (Jan. 7, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2011/01/06/AR2011010604386pf.html [https://perma.cc/QQ4G-WGYZ]; The Criminal Justice
Challenge, RIGHT ON CRIME, http://rightoncrime.comlthe-criminal-justice-challenge [https://per
ma.cclZ7LJ-YWK9].
16 See SENTENCING PROJECT, THE STATE OF SENTENCING 2015, at 3-4 (2016), http://
sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/State-of-Sentencing-2015.pdf [https://perma
.cc/69AQ-92SJ].
17 See generally Isaac Nevo & Vered Slonim-Nevo, The Myth of Evidence-Based Practice:
Towards Evidence-Informed Practice, 41 BRIT. J. SOC. WORK 1176, 1176-97 (2011); see also CTR.
FOR EFFECTIVE PUB. POLICY, A FRAMEWORK FOR EVIDENCE-BASED DECISION MAKING IN Lo-
CAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMs 7 (3d ed. 2010), http://cepp.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/A-
framework-for-evidence-based-decision-making-in-local-criminal-justice-systems.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/9RS4-QT9D].
18 The term "evidence-informed," rather than "evidence-based," has been used to refer to
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offices, and state courts, alongside researchers in multiple disciplines,
in partnership with scientific organizations and nonprofits, and with
substantial private funding. Efforts have focused on public safety, re-
ducing incarceration, and preventing wrongful convictions. Thus, pre-
trial release has been reshaped by state and local lawmakers and
judges, and based on analysis of recidivism data; reforms adopted in
more than half of the states rely on risk instruments. 19 Police increas-
ingly look to data concerning crime patterns, as well as patterns and
practices affecting officers' decisions to use force.20 Decades of psy-
chological research have transformed the use of eyewitness identifica-
tion procedures. 2 1 Mental health screening is increasingly conducted
and informed by medical standards. In each area, new policies raise
concerns about due process, criminal procedure, and equality and
nondiscrimination, as well as the quality of the evidence and analysis
on which criminal justice actors rely and their ability to rely upon it.
Part I of this Essay addresses what characterizes evidence-in-
formed criminal justice. Today, evidence-informed approaches have
exploded in an area largely resistant to empirically informed ap-
proaches of the past. Police agencies traditionally used training and
best practices principally based on conventional wisdom. Probation
decisionmaking relied upon the judgment of probation officers. Sen-
tencing decisionmaking relied on the judgment of sentencing judges.
Constitutional criminal procedure rules were based on rights that
judges traditionally identified as "fundamental." 22 Very little data ex-
isted in criminal justice settings to test what worked to accomplish
crime control or to protect individual rights.23 Use of data and tech-
nology is transforming much of our lives in profound and complex
ways and those changes are now reaching the criminal justice system.
the manner in which evidence may not provide a rigid formula for professionals but instead may
inform their practices. See Nevo & Slonim-Nevo, supra note 17, at 1176-97.
19 See SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 16, at 2-4 (describing reforms enacted in thirty
states just in the year 2015).
20 See Brandon Garrett & Seth Stoughton, A Tactical Fourth Amendment, 103 VA. L.
REV. 211, 217-18, 301 (2017).
21 See generally NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACAD., IDENTIFYING THE CUL-
PRIT: ASSESSING EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION (2014).
22 See, e.g., Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 445-46 (1992) (stating that applicable due
process test regarding state criminal procedure is a "fundamental fairness" test and not the cost-
benefit balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
23 For an extensive bibliography, see Annotated Bibliography: Evidence-Based Practices in
the Criminal Justice System, NAT'L INST. CORRECTIONS, https://s3.amazonaws.com/static.nicic
.gov/Library/026917.pdf [https://perma.cc/54VQ-A44K].
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Part II explores several key areas in which actors have adopted
evidence-informed approaches to criminal justice, despite the U.S. Su-
preme Court having done little to constrain traditional exercise of dis-
cretion. First, Part II describes the movement toward justice
reinvestment statutes-designed to reduce incarceration and direct
savings toward alternative sentencing and treatment-which have so
far accomplished only modest results. Second, as part of bail reform,
jurisdictions have moved toward using evidence-informed instruments
at the pretrial stage. Third, police increasingly use predictive data-
mining, new forms of surveillance, and body cameras. Fourth, scien-
tific research has driven the innocence revolution in criminal proce-
dure. Although judges in their postconviction rulings seemed largely
indifferent to claims of innocence-and the Supreme Court refused,
except hypothetically, to acknowledge due process claims of inno-
cence-hundreds of DNA exonerations have informed reforms draw-
ing on social science research. Finally, judges have begun to use risk
instruments in sentencing, which raises new possibilities and
concerns. 24
Part III of this Essay explains valid and sound uses of empirical
data and central concerns with the use of such data in criminal justice.
Criminal justice actors collect notoriously inadequate data. When data
exist, they are often disconnected from the types of social and non-
criminal justice data one would want to promote positive outcomes.
Looking too narrowly at criminal justice data may engender answers
unduly focused on criminal justice. Criminal justice actors are often
institutionally reluctant to use evidence-informed approaches, and the
underlying discretion of police, jurors, prosecutors, and judges may be
constitutionally protected. Even when adopted, evidence-informed
approaches must account for individual cognitive bias affecting exer-
cise of that discretion and for resulting errors in judgment. Evidence-
informed reforms at one stage may have unanticipated upstream and
downstream effects that have not been studied.25 There is also a juris-
24 For an overview, see Brandon L. Garrett & John Monahan, Judging Risk (Va. Pub. Law
& Legal Theory Research Paper No. 2018-44), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
id=3190403 [https://perma.cc/YQX6-8M3H].
25 See Jessica M. Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism Risk, 67 EMORY L.J. 59, 89-99 (2017);
Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination,
66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 842-62 (2014). For broader objections to the use of predictive or actuarial
instruments, see generally BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLIC-
ING, AND PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE (2007). But see Starr, supra, at 805-06 ("I strongly
endorse the objective of informing criminal justice policy generally, and sentencing specifically,
with data. My objection is specifically to the use of demographic, socioeconomic, family, and
neighborhood variables to determine whether and for how long a defendant is incarcerated.").
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dictional dimension: evidence-informed reforms in one jurisdiction
may not reflect outcomes in another type of jurisdiction. High-quality
systematic reviews of studies, like those conducted in medicine, will be
needed in criminal justice. Further, researchers must ask what data we
need and not just what we have.
Evidence-informed methods have already resulted in changes at
every level of the criminal justice process. The criminal justice system
in the United States is undergoing deep change; the hope is that this
change will be well informed by evidence.
I. THE ORIGINS OF EVIDENCE-BASED AND EVIDENCE-INFORMED
DECISIONMAKING
Evidence-informed methods, first championed by researchers in
medicine, have been adopted by government actors more generally,
and more recently by criminal justice actors.26 The evidence-based
revolution in medicine provides a model for how a tradition-bound
profession can change its approach to supplement and inform tradi-
tional discretion and judgment with sound scientific research.27 How-
ever, even in the field of medicine, where there are deep-pocketed
for-profit companies that provide services and conduct research, it has
taken decades to formulate standards for conducting studies and inte-
grating results in systemic reviews. 28 In criminal justice, over the past
decade, a broader set of law enforcement and criminal justice actors
have adopted evidence-informed approaches. 29 This Part describes ev-
idence-informed methods, as developed in medicine through work in
several scientific fields, and how those methods have slowly come to
influence other areas, including criminal justice. Part II will turn to
how research is impacting sentencing, pretrial detention, and a range
of aspects of policing that have remained focused on traditional pro-
fessional discretion for many decades.
26 See Edward T. Jennings, Jr. & Jeremy L. Hall, Evidence-Based Practice and the Use of
Information in State Agency Decision-Making 6-8 (Inst. for Federalism & Intergovernmental
Relations Working Paper Series, Paper No. 10, 2009), http://martin.uky.edu/sites/martin.uky.edu/
files/IFIR/Pub/IFIR-WP-2009-10.pdf [https://perma.cc/488B-Y8DP].
27 See JoHN S. HALLER, JR., SHADOW MEDICINE: THE PLACEBO IN CONVENTIONAL AND
ALTERNATIVE THERAPIES 1-2 (2014).
28 See id.
29 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Evidence-Based Law, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 901, 904 (2011).
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A. Evidence-Based and Evidence-Informed Methods
The term "evidence-based" first came into wide usage in the field
of medicine.30 A 1992 article by Dr. David Sackett (one of the foun-
ders of the evidence-based medicine movement) and his colleagues
described the then-new approach of evidence-based medicine, in
which the goal was to assess medical practices empirically.1 They de-
scribe the practice as "conscientious, explicit, and judicious use of cur-
rent best evidence in making decisions about the care of individual
patients."32 The object was to collect empirically validated, group-
based data that could then be used to inform the individual practices
of doctors. 33 That model has a real application in the criminal justice
setting; the goal is not to eliminate the discretion of individual practi-
tioners but to provide sound information to inform those practition-
ers' exercise of discretion.
The evidence-based medicine movement attempted to systemati-
cally assess which studies provided sound data that should inform doc-
tors when making clinical judgments.34 With the proliferation of
medical studies and new medical treatments being introduced; clini-
cians struggled to decide how best to treat a patient. In addition to the
concern that studies be systematically reviewed, there were also con-
cerns that the clinical judgments of physicians, relying on experience
or perhaps anecdote, might be not only informed by inadequate data
but also affected by cognitive biases. 35 Even sound data might not in-
form practitioners if they were not disposed to make use of it. This
related effort was grounded in psychological research.36 Developing
empirically informed decision methods might minimize the role that
such cognitive biases play. Further, a nationwide clearinghouse for ev-
idence-based clinical practice guidelines was created under the aus-
pices of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.37
30 See id. at 901.
31 Evidence-Based Med. Working Grp., Evidence-Based Medicine: A New Approach to
Teaching the Practice of Medicine, 268 JAMA 2420, 2420 (1992).
32 David L. Sackett et al., Evidence Based Medicine: What It Is and What It Isn't, 312 BRIT.
MED. J. 71, 71 (1996).
33 See Evidence-Based Med. Working Grp., supra note 31, at 2420-21; Jeffrey A. Claridge
& Timothy C. Fabian, History and Development of Evidence-Based Medicine, 29 WORLD J. SUR-
GERY 547, 550, 552 (2005). See generally David M. Eddy, History of Medicine: The Origins of
Evidence-Based Medicine-A Personal Perspective, 13 Am. MED. Ass'N J. ETHICS 55, 58 (2011).
34 See Evidence-Based Med. Working Grp., supra note 31, at 2420.
35 See id. at 2423.
36 See HALLER, supra note 27, at 16.
37 AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE REs. & QUALITY, https://www.ahrq.gov/gam/index.html
[https://perma.cc/CV47-Y8JR]. As of July 2018, however, this effort is no longer being funded.
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As part of the evidence-based medicine approach, the medical
community began to support systematic reviews of patient outcomes
under different health interventions, using criteria set out in advance
and not dependent on the outcomes of studies.38 Researchers estab-
lished the Cochrane Collaboration, a global network of clinicians
working on systematic reviews.39 This work was rooted in epidemiol-
ogy, the branch of medicine that analyzes the distribution and deter-
minations of health conditions in certain populations. The Cochrane
Collaboration criteria require that studies be objective, replicable, and
generalizable. Experiments are ideally done in randomized, double-
blind controlled trials, in which any information that might influence
the tester or the subject is withheld until the testing is completed,4 0 SO
that the persons participating in and running the experiment cannot
influence the results.41 Where that is not possible, quasi-experiments
may be conducted, which use a similar design to separate persons be-
ing treated, but without random assignment. The bottom of the hierar-
chy for quality of research in an area was traditional expert opinion.4 2
At the top of the hierarchy lay systematic reviews, assessing data
across studies using meta-analysis, with rigorous statistical analysis of
data.43 Thus, one 1992 study found major discrepancies between medi-
cal opinions concerning therapies following heart attacks as compared
to results from randomized controlled trials, including where doctors
continued to recommend "ineffective or possibly harmful" therapies.44
More recently, the use of algorithms developed through machine
learning, and not fully specified in advance, have been developed to
mine relationships in health data to identify potential treatments.4 5
See Guidelines and Measures Updates, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY, https://
www.ahrq.gov/gam/updates/index.html [https://perma.cc/PGC3-FB6U].
38 About Us, COCHRANE, http://www.cochrane.org/about-us [https://perma.ccl3K4R-
KPY5] ("Our mission is to promote evidence-informed health decision-making by producing
high-quality, relevant, accessible systematic reviews and other synthesized research evidence.").
39 See COCHRANE, https://www.cochrane.org [https://perma.cc/5XS5-CM8B].
40 R. BRIAN HAYNES ET AL., CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY: How To Do CLINICAL PRACTI-
CAL RESEARCH 94-95 (3d ed. 2006).
41 DAVID L. SACKETT ET AL., CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 196-97 (2d ed. 1991).
42 See Oxford Centre for Evidence-Based Medicine-Levels of Evidence, CTR. FOR Evi-
DENCE-BASED MED. (Mar. 2009), https://www.cebm.net/2009/06/oxford-centre-evidence-based-
medicine-levels-evidence-march-2009 [https://perma.cc/3NYH-939T].
43 See, e.g., id.
44 See Elliott M. Antman et al., A Comparison of Results of Meta-analyses of Randomized
Control Trials and Recommendations of Clinical Experts: Treatments for Myocardial Infarction,
268 JAMA 240, 241 (1992).
45 See generally W. Nicholson Price II, Black-Box Medicine, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 419
(2015).
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The U.S. Supreme Court's adoption of an empirically informed
standard for expert evidence in Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuti-
cals, Inc.4 6 and subsequent cases seemed to support this evidence-
based approach in medicine.47 However, the courts have not uni-
formly insisted on empirical foundations for expert testimony; they
largely rely on traditional expert credentials in the medical practice
context, while focusing on empirical evidence in the toxic tort context,
where causation is frequently a disputed issue.48 In criminal cases,
Daubert has seldom been applied, and the Supreme Court's Sixth
Amendment Confrontation Clause rulings regarding the obligation of
the state to call expert witnesses for cross-examination have done lit-
tle to regulate the quality of forensic science.4 9 Judges have not in-
sisted on even the most basic empirical research to support many
forensic techniques, much less systematic reviews or rigorous statisti-
cal analyses.5 0 Only gradually have ineffective assistance of counsel
cases addressed more of the underlying problems in the area.51 That
experience provides a cautionary tale for criminal procedure in an era
of evidence-based criminal justice. More promising have been civil
and regulatory efforts to address criminal justice problems, as dis-
cussed in the sections that follow. 5 2
B. Discretionary Criminal Justice
Since the 1967 President's Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice report, The Challenge of Crime in a Free
Society, there has been awareness that the criminal system lacks ade-
quate and empirically informed approaches. 5 3 That Report empha-
sized that many agencies were "not sure what their needs [were] or
how their practices compare[d] to the best practice of the field." 5 4 The
Report noted that state or regional bodies might be provided with
46 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
47 See id. at 592-95; see also Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999); Gen.
Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997).
48 Stephen Chris Pappas, Curing the Daubert Disappointment: Evidence-Based Medicine
and Expert Medical Testimony, 46 S. TEx. L. REv. 595, 598 (2003).
49 See Brandon L. Garrett & Gregory Mitchell, The Proficiency of Experts, 166 U. PA. L.
REV. 901, 902-05 (2018).
50 See id.
51 See generally Brandon L. Garrett, Constitutional Regulation of Forensic Evidence, 73
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1147 (2016).
52 See Garrett & Mitchell, supra note 49 (discussing the failure of judicial gatekeeping in
forensic science and the need for regulation of proficiency of experts).
53 See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAw ENF'T & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 273.
54 Id. at 286.
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resources to conduct studies and assessments to help improve criminal
justice.55 The Report offered that the federal government could lead
in efforts to improve the collection of data needed by criminal justice
agencies. 56 This was imagined not just as collection of criminal records
or fingerprints (today, DNA databases, which are maintained feder-
ally), but also information to evaluate the effectiveness of criminal jus-
tice itself.57 There was insufficient data to assess how effective policing
was on crime, much less the costs and benefits of alternative ap-
proaches.58 The Report called for "major demonstration projects" to
assess whether "major changes" could "improve the system of crimi-
nal justice" in state and local jurisdictions.5 9 Interdisciplinary research,
involving "top scholars from the social and natural sciences, law, so-
cial work, business administration and psychiatry," would be con-
vened in institutes centered at universities to address criminal justice
research and to analyze data.60
These recommendations were largely neglected, although leading
research bodies such as the National Academies of Sciences did con-
tinue to convene scholars to study criminal justice. The National Insti-
tute for Justice, housed at the Department of Justice, was created to
fund criminal justice-related research, and leading nonprofits contin-
ued to analyze criminal justice data, including with federal grant
support.6 1
For decades thereafter, as crime rates rose,6 2 criminal justice pol-
icy was dominated by a tough-on-crime approach, in which incarcera-
tion and severe sentencing were embraced as the best responses to
55 Id.
56 See id.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 287.
59 Id. at 286.
60 Id. at 287-88.
61 See Tonry, supra note 4, at 1-2; see also David Weisburd et al., Preface, Assessing Sys-
tematic Evidence in Crime and Justice: Methodological Concerns and Empirical Outcomes, 587
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POLITICAL & Soc. Sci. 6 (2003).
Much practice in crime and justice, as in fields like medicine or education, is based
on long-term traditions and clinical experience. Although tradition and experience
often provide the only guidance for criminal justice practitioners, there is a growing
consensus among scholars, practitioners, and policy makers that crime control prac-
tices and policies should be rooted as much as possible in scientific research.
Id. (citations omitted).
62 See Lauren-Brooke "L.B." Eisen & Oliver Roeder, America's Faulty Perception of
Crime Rates, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Mar. 16, 2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/
americas-faulty-perception-crime-rates [https://perma.cc/J23M-UP88] (showing that the inci-
dence of violent crime sharply increased between 1960 and 1980).
[Vol. 86:14901500
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rising crime. Policymakers did have a view of the evidence: they gen-
erally thought that there was insufficient evidence to support rehabili-
tative alternatives to incarceration. Efforts to treat mental illness were
abandoned due to concerns about abysmal conditions at state mental
hospitals.6 3 Criminal adjudication was largely supplanted by a system
of plea bargaining. Data-driven approaches played little role in these
transformations of the criminal system.
While evidence-informed approaches were slow to come to crimi-
nal justice, several early pieces of federal legislation did provide some
nascent encouragement to the field. 64 In 1972, the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 196865 was amended to require that
local criminal-justice grants be evaluated. 66 In the 1970s, the first ef-
forts to assess the accuracy of forensic science disciplines were under-
taken, including an early program to assess the accuracy of forensic
experts in their routine casework. 67 The 1988 Anti-Drug Abuse Act
Byrne Grants program stated that grants should be provided only to
projects of "proven effectiveness."68 Those conditions, however, did
not produce large bodies of new research on effective criminal justice
strategies. Michael Tonry has called criminal justice policy an "evi-
dence-free zone." 69 He has noted that despite "[t]he creation of gov-
ernmental institutions that sponsor and fund research, the
development of university departments in criminal justice and crimi-
nology, and the accumulation of large sophisticated scientific litera-
tures have not resulted in the development of evidence-based policies
as a norm in American criminal justice systems." 70 Tonry has
bemoaned how evidence-based policing has focused on crime control,
rather than "evidence-based sentencing, sanctioning, drug policy, and
gun policy." Evidence supporting tough-on-crime policies was em-
63 See John Monahan & Jennifer L. Skeem, Risk Redux: The Resurgence of Risk Assess-
ment in Criminal Sanctioning, 26 FED. SENT'G REP. 158, 158 (2014).
64 See STAN ORCHOWSKY, JUSTICE RESEARCH & STATISTICS AsS'N, AN INTRODUCTION TO
EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICES 2-5 (2014), http://www.jrsa.org/pubs/reports/ebp-briefing-paper
april20l4.pdf [https://perma.cc/38H2-SKAA].
65 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
66 See Orchowsky, supra note 64, at 4.
67 See Garrett & Mitchell, supra note 49, at 914-18.
68 Lawrence W. Sherman, Introduction: The Congressional Mandate to Evaluate, in LAW-
RENCE W. SHERMAN ET AL., PREVENTING CRIME 1-1 (1997).
69 See Tonry, supra note 4, at 1.
70 Id. at 11-12.
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braced but not evidence supporting rehabilitative or preventative
policies.7 1
Things began to slowly change, however, in the area of policing.
Evidence-based policing, as described by Lawrence W. Sherman in a
1998 report, came to refer to a family of information-driven ap-
proaches that police agencies began to use increasingly in the 1990s. 72
Sherman argued that the "paradigm of 'evidence-based medicine'
holds important implications for policing."73 Sherman called for
''proactive" efforts to collect and analyze new data to better assess
police practices.74 Much of this consisted of problem-oriented and hot-
spot policing.75 By the late 1990s, more data was being collected on
police activity, particularly to inform targeting and arrests, but also for
other purposes.76
For example, by the late 1990s, civil rights groups were seeking to
use police data to document and evaluate patterns of racial profiling.77
Lawsuit settlements, consent decrees, statutes, and voluntary efforts
by agencies were requiring police to collect data on stops, searches,
and uses of force to track race-based patterns and identify officers
who might be overusing force.78 To be sure, efforts to remedy race-
based patterns in searches and use of force could drag on for years,
while efforts to target police would be implemented quickly and at
great cost. 7 9 But data collection became at least somewhat more two-
sided: used to both deploy and evaluate policing. In this area, at least,
criminal justice was becoming modestly more evidence-informed.
II. THE RISE OF EVIDENCE-INFORMED CRIMINAL JUSTICE
In the past fifteen years, evidence-informed methods have
reached more broadly into criminal justice. Not just police, but sen-
71 See id. at 13.
72 See generally Lawrence W. Sherman, Evidence-Based Policing, IDEAS AM. POLICING,
July 1998, at 1, 3-4, 6-8, 13.
73 Id. at 1.
74 See id.
75 See Lawrence W. Sherman, The Rise of Evidence-Based Policing: Targeting, Testing,
and Tracking, in 42 CRIME AND JUSTICE IN AMERICA, 1975-2025, supra note 4, at 377, 378-79,
403-05.
76 See Brandon L. Garrett, Remedying Racial Profiling, 33 COLUM. Hum. RTs. L. REV. 41,
115-25 (2001).
77 Id. at 115-16.
78 For an early analysis, see Garrett, supra note 76, at 45-46, 78-82, 92.
79 See Rachel A. Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive Policing Reform, 62
STAN. L. REV. 1 (2009) (describing limited Department of Justice resources to reform police
departments).
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tencing commissions, jails, prisons, prosecutors, and courts have be-
gun to consider criminal justice data. These efforts have touched each
stage in the criminal process, and they are worth considering as a
group. There is the concern that inadequate research currently exists
on many important questions. Moreover, these types of problems are
interdisciplinary; they require knowledge of mental health, risk assess-
ment, cognitive bias, police practices, correctional practices, judicial
practices, and more. Cecelia Klingele puts it well: "The prospect of
wading through literature on human behavior, psychology, and
medicine to locate practices that are supported by sound research is a
daunting task for most criminal justice agencies, many of whom do not
employ analysts or other formally trained social scientists."80 A first
wave of scholarship has examined whether these new technologies can
or should raise new constitutional questions.81 Questions regarding
the accuracy, effectiveness, and equity of these methods have already
become front-and-center concerns.8 2 This Part will introduce such con-
cerns in each area, but these concerns will be the focus of Part III.
A. Justice Reinvestment
Perhaps the most far-reaching recent evidence-informed inter-
vention in the United States, in its ambition and in its degree of legis-
lative adoption, has been the Justice Reinvestment Initiative ("JRI").
The JRI is a partnership between the U.S. Department of Justice Bu-
reau of Justice Assistance, the Council of State Governments Justice
Center, the Crime and Justice Institute, the Pew Charitable Trusts,
and the Vera Institute of Justice. 3 They initiated the JRI during the
80 Cecelia Klingele, The Promises and Perils of Evidence-Based Corrections, 91 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 537, 557 (2015).
81 See, e.g., Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163
U. PA. L. REV. 327, 335 (2015) (discussing the effect of big data technology on policing and on
distorting the reasonable suspicion standard); Michael L. Rich, Machine Learning, Automated
Suspicion Algorithms, and the Fourth Amendment, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 871 (2016). For analysis in
the area of forensic evidence, see generally Andrea Roth, Trial by Machine, 104 GEO. L.J. 1245
(2016). For analysis in the area of pretrial risk assessment, see generally Sandra G. Mayson,
Dangerous Defendants, 127 YALE L.J. 490, 507-18 (2018).
82 See Fan, supra note 12, at 639-40 ("Telling the public that rehabilitation can work, and
providing data on how the shared interest in safety and reform is served, is more effective in
building coalitions to facilitate progress than preaching from a particular normative
worldview.").
83 See Justice Reinvestment Initiative, BUREAU JUST. ASSISTANCE, https://www.bja.gov/Pro
grams/jri background.html [https://perma.cc/HM7M-AR4W]; see also NANCY LA VIGNE ET AL.,
URBAN INST., THE JUSTICE REINVESTMENT INITIATIVE (2013), https://www.urban.org/sites/de
fault/files/publication/23881/412879-The-Justice-Reinvestment-Initiative-Experiences-from-the-
States.pdf [https://perma.cclT94A-X9UM].
2018] 1503
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
2001-2003 post-dot-com recession, chiefly to alleviate state budget
challenges.84 The object was to analyze data to focus on reducing in-
carceration and using the resulting savings to reinvest in further ef-
forts to reduce incarceration. Cecilia Klingele has written that "it is
difficult to overstate the influence that JRI, [National Institute of Cor-
rections], and similar state and locally initiated efforts have on the
spread of evidence-based correctional practices."85
More than thirty states have adopted some version of JRI legisla-
tion,8 6 as have lawmakers in the United Kingdom, but the results so
far appear mixed. A group of scholars and lawyers, for example, ex-
amined twenty-seven states that have participated in the JRI, eighteen
of which have adopted legislation, and noted that the outcomes in the
states have been complex. 87 These reviewers suggest that savings from
reducing incarceration have generally not been redirected toward fur-
ther crime prevention or rehabilitation, but rather committed to gen-
eral state budgets.88 Further, the JRI has often reduced prison growth
but not reduced the current (and record) levels of incarceration.89 One
reason for this, these reviewers suggest, is that the JRI has been less
informed by evidence than its architects intended. The JRI approach
sought to have policymakers reduce incarceration, study the impact of
those changes, and set out options for further savings and reduced
incarceration.90 Beginning in 2008, however, as the authors of an im-
portant 2015 report described, the JRI now has more general goals,
without detailed language on measuring performance, impacts, and
ensuring accountability. 91 Some states have largely used the savings to
provide more resources to police for crime control, and have not ade-
quately reinvested in data-driven efforts to prevent crime and reduce
incarceration. 92
Thus, the push for JRI has not been nearly as evidence-informed
as it was originally intended to be, nor has substantial reinvestment
typically resulted. Thus, the authors of the 2015 report note, "If the
goal is to reduce mass incarceration, there is scant evidence of success.
84 See JAMES AUSTIN ET AL., ENDING MASS INCARCERATION 1, 2 (2013).
85 Klingele, supra note 80, at 566.
86 31 States Reform Criminal Justice Policies Through Justice Reinvestment, PEW CHARITA-
BLE TR. (Jan. 2016), http://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2016/01/pspp-jrireformmatrixover
view.pdf [https://perma.cc/2HWE-KCLW].
87 See AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 84, at 1.
88 See id. at 1-3.
89 Id. at 1.
90 See id. at 6-7.
91 Id. at 7.
92 See id. at 7, 9 (discussing Wisconsin and Oklahoma legislation).
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More alarming, there is little indication that historic rates of incarcera-
tion will be reduced in the future." 93 Indeed, four states that have ac-
complished large reductions in incarceration, California, New York,
New Jersey, and Michigan, have done so for very different reasons,
including sentencing reforms and prison-related litigation indepen-
dent of JRI.94 More recently, states like Illinois, Louisiana, and Mary-
land have accomplished new declines in incarceration, largely due to
JRI legislation in Maryland and Louisiana and broader criminal jus-
tice reform statutes in Illinois.95 Although incarceration declined in
thirty states in the past year, incarceration increased in twenty states
in 2016-2017, particularly in Kentucky and Tennessee.96 Still other
states, like Texas, have accomplished declines in prison growth but not
a significant reduction in incarceration.97 It remains to be seen
whether a second generation of legislative efforts can rely more force-
fully on evidence to reduce reliance on incarceration.
B. Pretrial Diversion and Risk Assessment
Jurisdictions have experimented with approaches toward releas-
ing certain classes of offenders outright pretrial or providing treat-
ment alternatives to incarceration, including as part of the JRI statutes
described above. One way that evidence-informed methods have al-
tered criminal justice has been the creation of alternative dockets and
courts that are not focused on incarceration. Drug courts, for example,
have proliferated. Studies of such courts suggest that they can reduce
recidivism, although the selection of individuals for drug courts can
make it difficult to assess their efficacy. 98 Concerns remain regarding
drug courts, particularly with respect to racial disparity and the disad-
93 Id. at 11.
94 Id. at 12. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in the overcrowding case concerning California
prisons that an Eighth Amendment remedy was required, and that did have a real effect in
California. See Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 511 (2011).
95 See Nicole Lewis, Maryland Leads as Prison Populations Continue to Decline, MAR-
SHALL PROJECT (May 18, 2018, 12:00 AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/05/18/mary
land-leads-as-prison-populations-continue-to-decline [https://perma.cc/NN26-KTDJ].
96 See id.
97 See AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 84, at 15.
98 See U.S. GovT ACCOUNTABILYTY OFFIcE, GAO-05-219, ADULT DRUG COURTS: Evi-
DENCE INDICATES RECIDIVISM REDUCTIONS AND MIXED RESULTS FOR OTHER OUTCOMES 45
(2005), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05219.pdf [https://perma.cc/XTV7-LZLQ]; Eric L. Jensen
& Clayton Mosher, Adult Drug Courts: Emergence, Growth, Outcome Evaluations, and the Need
for a Continuum of Care, 42 IDAHO L. REv. 443, 463 (2006).
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vantaged.99 A range of jurisdictions have required judges to consider a
risk or lethality assessment in domestic violence cases.100
A range of jurisdictions have considered using evidence-informed
methods as an alternative to traditionally judge-made decisions
whether to release someone on bail or not. The concern with the
traditional approach was that those with resources can afford to make
bail, while the poor are kept in jail, including many people who might
not actually pose any risk of reoffense or flight. The Constitution has
little to say on that subject, since the Supreme Court has to date inter-
preted the Eighth Amendment's excessive bail requirement as not
creating a right to bail but rather calling for a broad balancing of
"compelling government interest" as against the individual's rights.01
However, many more jurisdictions are studying and implementing
sweeping changes to pretrial treatment of arrestees. Reasons for doing
so include concern with overincarceration and lengthy periods of de-
tention pretrial, concern regarding the harmful effects of that deten-
tion (including for vulnerable populations), and the cost of
burgeoning jail populations, as well as suicides by individuals detained
and media attention to jail conditions.1 02
Another driving force behind reform has been the availability of
new instruments to be used for purposes of making decisions regard-
ing pretrial release. State supreme courts, such as the Indiana Su-
preme Court, the Kentucky Supreme Court, the Nebraska Judicial
Council, and the New Jersey Supreme Court have ordered studies or
sweeping changes. 0 3 New Jersey, as well as more than two dozen local
jurisdictions, is using a public safety assessment tool funded by the
99 See Josh Bowers, Contraindicated Drug Courts, 55 UCLA L. REV. 783, 786, 803-04
(2008); Eric J. Miller, Embracing Addiction: Drug Courts and the False Promise of Judicial In-
terventionism, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1479, 1568-69 (2004).
100 See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. § 13-3601.91 (LexisNexis 2015); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 25
§ 2803-B(1)(D)(5) (2015).
101 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required. . . ."); United States v.
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 754-55 (1987) (noting that the Eighth Amendment does not grant abso-
lute right to bail).
102 See, e.g., Salerno, 481 U.S. at 754-55.
103 See, e.g., Am. Order, In re Authorizing Non-Financial Uniform Schedule of Bail Admin-
istrative Release Program, No. 2015-24 (Ky. Dec. 2, 2015); Pretrial Release Outcomes Studied by
Nevada Judiciary, NVCOURTS.Gov (Oct. 2, 2015, 1:41 PM), http://nvcourts.gov/Supreme/News/
PretrialReleaseOutcomesStudiedbyNevadaJudiciary [https://perma.cc/BPW3-YAED];
Supreme Court Issues Order on Pretrial Release, IND. LAWYER (Dec. 23, 2014), http://www.thein
dianalawyer.com/supreme-court-issues-order-on-pretrial-release/PARAMS/article/35974 [https://
perma.ccE9SV-6X6X].
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nonprofit Laura and John Arnold Foundation. 104 The tool, based on
analysis of 1,500,000 criminal cases, is publicly available for free and
designed to remove factors that have in the past been associated with
disparate pretrial detention of minorities-such as arrest history-in
favor of factors such as history of missing court appearances.105
In addition to the focus on risk, other assessment instruments fo-
cus on needs separately or in conjunction with a risk assessment. New
mental health screening instruments are being developed to identify
and potentially divert arrestees for treatment. For example, Virginia
implemented new mental health screening measures at jails statewide
in 2017.106
In addition to legislation seeking to divert categories of offenders
pretrial, evidence-informed practices have begun to reach other crimi-
nal justice actors often neglected in the legal literature. Discussions of
institutional incentives in criminal justice often do not include depart-
ments of corrections and community corrections agencies but instead
focus on police and prosecutors. 1 07 However, in some states correc-
tions agencies have been tasked with reducing prison populations, and
in others corrections have taken it upon themselves to study ways to
reduce the use of jail in local communities.108 The National Institute of
Corrections has described how its recommended evidence-informed
approach proceeds, for community corrections, first by assessing ac-
tual risks and needs in a jurisdiction, then by supporting targeted in-
terventions, reinforcing those efforts, training state and local actors,
measuring progress, and providing further reinforcement and feed-
back.109 To take on this approach, "[o]rganizations must critically ex-
amine their missions and values; gain new knowledge and skills; adjust
their infrastructure to support new ways of doing business and trans-
form their organizational culture."110 Corrections agencies that make
104 See Jon Shuppe, Post Bail, NBC NEWS (Aug. 22, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/spe
cials/bail-reform [https://perma.cc/UW3B-69SV].
105 See id.
106 Evanne Armour, Virginia Addressing Mental Health Within Jails, WAVY.com (June 20,
2017, 8:08 PM), http://wavy.com/2017/06/20/virginia-addressing-mental-health-within-jails [https:/
/perma.cc/M6ZT-SHUS].
107 See, e.g., Stuntz, supra note 8.
108 See generally Francis T. Cullen et al., Eight Lessons from Moneyball- The High Cost of
Ignoring Evidence-Based Corrections, 4 VICTIMS & OFFENDERS 197, 197-213 (2009).
109 MEGHAN GUEVARA & ENVER SOLOMON, CRIME & JUSTICE INST. & NAT'L INST. OF
CORR., IMPLEMENTING EVIDENCE-BASED POLICY AND PRACTICE IN COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS,
at x-xi (2d ed. 2009), https://s3.amazonaws.com/static.nicic.gov/Library/024107.pdf [https://perma
.cc/98ZR-NQA8].
110 See id. at xii.
2018] 1507
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
probation decisions, or decisions on whether to release individuals
pretrial, use risk- and needs-based instruments increasingly to make
their decisions."'1 In the area of indigent defense, a number of state
commissions and individual offices have used data collection to inform
how they conduct their work.112
C. Policing
Over the past few decades, policing has been transformed by
greater reliance on evidence, even if much remains to be studied and
improved. Traditional policing relied upon patrols and reactive re-
sponses to crime reports, and during investigations police used their
own judgment, largely, to gather and test evidence. 113 Over the past
three decades, there has been a steady shift toward analysis of crime
data and proactive assessment of how to target crime, predict it, and
reassess police methods. 11 4 None of this was affected by the courts or
by constitutional criminal procedure, which largely enshrined tradi-
tional police discretion.115 Instead, this revolution came about due to
innovations by police and researchers. Beginning in the 1990s, police
departments adopted databases to track crime patterns and target re-
sources; the COMPSTAT approach in New York City is a well-known
example. 116
Broader in its approach, problem-oriented policing emerged, as
defined by Herman Goldstein, as a way of orienting policing around
underlying causes of community problems and not just crime pat-
terns.11 7 In a way, the goal was to focus on a broader array of evi-
dence, not just solving crimes but preventing crime and other social
111 See, e.g., Evidence-Based Policies and Practices, CrrY N.Y., http://www.nyc.gov/htmli/
prob/html/aboutlevidence.shtml [https://perma.cc/U8NP-5JZP] ("Evidence-based policies and
practices (EBPP) use current research and the best available data to guide decisions and pro-
duce the outcomes that our stakeholders-probation clients, victims, and communities-
expect.").
112 See generally Jennifer E. Laurin, Gideon by the Numbers: The Emergence of Evidence-
Based Practice in Indigent Defense, 12 OmIo ST. J. CRIM. L. 325 (2015); Pamela Metzger &
Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Defending Data, 88 S. CAL. L. REv. 1057 (2015).
113 Sherman, supra note 75, at 378.
114 Id. at 378-79.
115 One early reliance on research concerning police shootings, in the Supreme Court's
ruling in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), was largely eroded by subsequent rulings. See
Garrett & Stoughton, supra note 20, at 224.
116 See Sherman, supra note 75, at 378-79. See generally POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE AssISTANCE, COMPSTAT (2013), https://www.bja.gov/Publications/PER-F-
Compstat.pdf [https://perma.cc/4J9D-SJGR].
117 Herman Goldstein, What Is POP?, CTR. FOR PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING (2001),
http://www.popcenter.org/about/?p=whatiscpop [https://perma.cc/35VC-DM7H].
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problems."" Many police agencies now adopt some version of a prob-
lem-oriented policing approach.1 19 Crime analysts began to be em-
ployed by police agencies.120 Reactive investigations became more
informed by scientific methods and forensic techniques.121 The Na-
tional Research Council conducted an assessment of the problem-ori-
ented policing literature, and just one systematic review exists.1 2 2
Still more recently, police have begun to use far more sophisti-
cated data mining. Police use algorithms to find patterns in data con-
cerning offenders to target resources and even target individuals,
using what Michael Rich calls "automated suspicion algorithms."1 2 3
These data may include arrest and crime reports but also other con-
tent, including data from social media.1 24 Individuals may be tracked
using GPS or video.1 2 5
Policing data has also been used to evaluate police practices.
Studies have examined whether police have stopped and searched in-
dividuals disproportionately because of race;1 26 what types of search
criteria are more likely to result in arrests;12 7 whether police use of
118 See id.
119 See History of Problem-Oriented Policing, CTR. FOR PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING,
http://www.popcenter.org/about/?p=history [https://perma.cc/LL9V-7M4X]; see also Sherman,
supra note 75.
120 A History of Crime Analysis, JUST. ACAD. 4, http://www.justiceacademy.org/iShare/Li
brary-CrimeAnalysis/historyofcrimeanalysis.pdf [https://perma.cc/C8ZL-ZX9X].
121 See Key Elements of Problem-Oriented Policing, CTR. FOR PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLIC-
ING, http://www.popcenter.org/about/?p=elements [https://perma.cc/3RC7-9XLGI; see also Sher-
man, supra note 75.
122 See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, FAIRNESS AND EFFEcrIVENESS IN POLICING 243-46
(Wesley Skogan & Kathleen Frydl eds., 2004) (finding modest effectiveness among the variable
approaches adopted, but also noting the small number of solid studies and the lack of consistent
effort to study which problem-oriented interventions work); David Weisburd et al., Is Problem-
Oriented Policing Effective in Reducing Crime and Disorder?: Findings from a Campbell System-
atic Review, 9 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 139, 164 (2010).
123 Rich, supra note 81, at 876.
124 Id. at 873-74.
125 Michael L. Rich, Machines as Crime Fighters-Are You Ready?, 30 CRIM. JUST. 10,
Winter 2016, at 10.
126 See, e.g., Expert Report of Jeffrey Fagan at 63, Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp.
2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 08-1034), https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/assets/files/Expert
ReportJeffreyFagan.pdf [https://perma.cc/U48A-XRJJ]; Racial Disparity in Consent Searches
and Dog Sniff Searches: An Analysis of Illinois Traffic Stop Data from 2013, ACLU ILL. (Aug.
13, 2014), https://www.aclu-il.orglen/publications/racial-disparity-consent-searches-and-dog-sniff-
searches [https://perma.cc/R7FM-RLCM].
127 See generally Jeffrey Fagan, Terry's Original Sin, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 43, 43-96
(2016); Sharad Goel et al., Precinct or Prejudice? Understanding Racial Disparities in New York
City's Stop-and-Frisk Policy, 10 ANNALS APPLIED STAT. 365, 365-94 (2015).
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data to conduct hot-spot policing is effective;1 28 and whether police
and large-scale stop-and-frisk programs have been effective in deter-
ring crime.1 2 9 The chief remedy that emerged from litigation, statutes,
and changes to policy-both voluntary and due to federal consent de-
crees-was data collection.13 0
How problems are defined, which data are used, and how data
are categorized raise difficult questions. Jennifer Laurin notes that
"determining whether the best measure of the quality of a stop-and-
frisk program [is] the number of arrests, the number of charges
brought, the amount of contraband recovered, the sense of satisfac-
tion of members of the community, or some other measure is far from
a value-neutral process."' 3 ' Without transparency, it may be difficult
for researchers or the public to know whether the algorithms used are
fair or accurate. Law enforcement often keeps investigative methods
non-public and has often entered contracts with private companies to
supply technology, conditioned by nondisclosure contracts.1 32 Moreo-
ver, there has been little review of the methods used, outside of litiga-
tion concerning race discrimination in police activity. Sherman notes,
"the vast scale of the rise of evidence in policing leaves it without a
fair comparison group."1 33 That does not itself provide cause to be
sure that these interventions are working.
That said, there has been a remarkable shift in the culture of po-
lice organizations, researchers, and professionals, with government re-
positories of research on policing, police chiefs endorsing research and
evidence-based methods, and a broad embrace of data-oriented ap-
proaches.1 34 It is a remarkable culture shift.
D. The Innocence Movement
An innocence revolution in criminal justice in the United States
has resulted in a culture shift toward greater use of scientific and more
accurate evidence in criminal cases. Postconviction DNA testing has
128 Anthony A. Braga et al., The Effects of Hot Spots Policing on Crime: An Updated Sys-
tematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 31 JUST. Q. 633, 633 (2014).
129 See, e.g., David Weisburd et al., Do Stop, Question, and Frisk Practices Deter Crime?:
Evidence at Microunits of Space and Time, 15 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 31 (2015) (finding
modest deterrent effect). But see Richard Rosenfeld & Robert Fornango, The Impact of Police
Stops on Precinct Robbery and Burglary Rates in New York City, 2003-2010, 31 JUST. Q. 96
(2014).
130 See Garrett, supra note 76, at 107-47.
131 Laurin, supra note 112, at 333.
132 See Rich, supra note 125, at 14.
133 Sherman, supra note 75, at 380.
134 See id. at 381-82; History of Problem-Oriented Policing, supra note 119.
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exonerated 350 men and women; 20 had been sentenced to death.135
Additional research has studied broader groups of exonerations; most
comprehensive is the National Registry of Exonerations, which docu-
mented over two thousand individuals exonerated in the United
States in just the past twenty-five years. 1 3 6 A body of empirical re-
search has explored the facts underlying such exonerations. In re-
sponse to these developments, all legislatures in the United States
have now enacted statutes to permit postconviction access to new evi-
dence of innocence. Many jurisdictions have improved procedures
concerning interrogations, lineups, and other types of evidence. Prose-
cutors have created conviction-integrity units tasked with reinvestigat-
ing closed cases. In the past, wrongful convictions were thought to be
rare if not impossible occurrences.137 Judge Learned Hand famously
called "the ghost of the innocent man convicted" an "unreal
dream."1 38 As in other areas, accuracy was seen as a topic to be left to
the discretion of investigators tasked with gathering reliable evi-
dence.139 Investigators were not required to document that evidence
carefully. Interrogations were unrecorded. Eyewitness identification
procedures were informal. Forensic analyses were presented based on
the experience and judgment of an analyst. In more than four decades,
the Supreme Court has not revisited the factors set out in its 1976
ruling Manson v. Brathwaite,1 4 0 which held that eyewitness identifica-
tions may be admitted if deemed "reliable," even if police engaged in
contaminating suggestion. 141
Prompted by the experience of those exonerations and decades of
research involving thousands of studies, the National Academy of Sci-
ences produced a detailed report in 2014, Identifying the Culprit: As-
sessing Eyewitness Identification.142 The report was informed by
135 For a current count of such cases, see Featured Cases, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www
.innocenceproject.org/all-cases/#exonerated-by-dna [https://perma.cc/GAP4-U4K9]. For an in-
depth study of the first 250 such cases, see BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT
(2011). For detailed data regarding DNA exoneration cases, see CONVICTING THE INNOCENT:
DNA EXONERATIONS DATABASE, http://www.convictingtheinnocent.com [https://perma.cc/5J8
G-4TVU].
136 A current count of exonerations may be found on the National Registry of Exonera-
tions website. See NAT'L REGISTRY EXONERATIONs, https://www.law.umich.edu/speciallexonera
tion/Pages/about.aspx [https://perma.cc/FMR7-3S57].
137 PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON Sci. & TECH., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESI-
DENT, FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS 78 (2016).
138 United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
139 See id.
140 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
141 See id.; see also Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228 (2012).
142 See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACAD., supra note 21.
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neuroscience, social science, and statistics, and it set out best practices
for policing agencies, recommendations for courts, and a research
agenda for further eyewitness memory research. 143 Those recom-
mended procedures include conducting identifications "blind" or
"blinded" so that the person running the procedure could not inadver-
tently signal the answer. More agencies are improving their eyewit-
ness identification procedures. In 2017, the U.S. Department of Justice
adopted a set of guidelines on best practices for federal law enforce-
ment agencies. In the area of false confessions research, an important
white paper from the American Psychology and Law Society lays out
a set of reforms to prevent contaminated and false confession state-
ments. Most important is that entire interrogations be videotaped. 44
Forensic science increasingly looks to basic science to improve
methods. Aggregate data lies behind modern DNA testing, which,
rather than relying on the traditional experience and judgment of a
forensic analyst, relies on population data concerning genetic traits
and statistical calculations concerning the random likelihood that an-
other individual might share a given genetic profile. DNA profiles are
stored in large databanks to be compared with DNA recovered during
unsolved crime investigations. In 2009, an influential National Acad-
emy of Sciences report concluded, "With the exception of nuclear
DNA analysis, however, no forensic method has been rigorously
shown to have the capacity to demonstrate consistently, and with a
high degree of certainty, a connection between evidence and a specific
individual or source." 145 Seven years later, in 2016, the President's
Council of Advisors on Science and Technology issued a report high-
lighting that little had changed and more strongly stating that several
forensic techniques should no longer be used in court until sufficient
scientific research is done to validate their accuracy and reliability.1 46
That report also emphasized the need for information about error
rates in forensic disciplines and proficiency of particular examiners
and laboratories.1 47
The research underlying these reforms, as the role of the National
Academy of Sciences suggests, has occurred across several scientific
disciplines, including neuroscience, psychology, and statistics. A new
143 Id.
144 See Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and Recommenda-
tions, 34 LAW & Hum. BEHAV. 3, 19 (2010).
145 NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACAD., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE
IN THE UNITED STATES 7 (2009).
146 See PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 137, at 57, 102.
147 Id. at 12.
[Vol. 86:14901512
EVIDENCE-INFORMED CRIMINAL JUSTICE
generation of statistical work has examined whether machine learning
or more sophisticated statistical models can provide a sound empirical
basis for traditional pattern-matching forensics like fingerprinting or
ballistics, which have involved subjective and not quantitative conclu-
sions in the past.1 4 8 A new generation of psychological work has ex-
amined cognitive bias issues in forensics, including how a range of
biases in information and practices can alter the conclusions that fo-
rensic analysts reach.1 4 9 As a result, the connection between law and
science in informing the accuracy of criminal justice has never been
greater.
E. Risk-Based Sentencing
Incarceration may produce diminishing returns as a method to
prevent crime.150 Of prisoners released, three-fourths will be rear-
rested within five years, and half will return to jail or prison.' 5 A se-
ries of studies, including a recent meta-analysis, suggests that
empirical evidence is lacking to show that severe sentences have a de-
terrent effect on crime.1 52 As a result, better detection of crime and
more certain and speedy imposition of consequences may better de-
ter: improved policing may prove more useful in combatting crime
than imprisonment. One alternative is to use risk assessment.
In the past, states have based length of sentences in part on an
assessment of the future dangerousness of the offender, as did parole
agencies. 53 The U.S. Supreme Court has approved the use of future
dangerousness at sentencing, including in death penalty cases and in-
cluding using traditional clinical judgments that may be highly unrelia-
148 See, e.g., NICHOLAS D.K. PETRACO ET AL., DOCUMENT No. 239048, APPLICATION OF
MACHINE LEARNING TO TOOLMARKS: STATISTICALLY BASED METHODS FOR IMPRESSION PAT-
TERN COMPARISONS (2011); Brandon L. Garrett, Gregory Mitchell & Nicholas Scurich, Compar-
ing Categorical and Probabilistic Fingerprint Evidence, 63 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1712 (2018).
149 See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACAD., supra note 21, at 10; see also Itiel
E. Dror & David Charlton, Why Experts Make Errors, 56 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 600,
610-14 (2006).
150 FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, INCAPACITATION: PENAL CONFINEMENT
AND THE RESTRAINT OF CRIME 5 (1995).
151 MATTHEW R. DUROSE ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 30 STATES IN 2005: PATTERNS FROM 2005 To 2010, at 7
(2014); Jeremy Travis, But They All Come Back: Rethinking Prisoner Reentry, SENT'G & COR-
RECTIONS, May 2000, at 2-4.
152 See Natalie Schell-Busey et al., What Works?: A Systematic Review of Corporate Crime
Deterrence, 15 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 387, 397 (2016).
153 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.06 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final Draft 2017) (regarding
sentencing).
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ble.154 The Court has explained that "prediction of future criminal
conduct is an essential element in many of the decisions rendered
throughout our criminal justice system."1 55 The Court has also found
unconstitutionally ineffective the conduct of a defense attorney who
failed to object to an expert's use of race when making predictions of
dangerousness. 1 5 6
Today, an increasing number of states use risk-based instruments
to inform decisionmaking at sentencing.15 7 State supreme courts have
approved the use of risk assessment in sentencing, and statutes have
required judges to consider risk assessment during sentencing.58 A
2007 National Center for State Courts report on evidence-based sen-
tencing encouraged this movement. 159 The Model Penal Code revi-
sions considered in 2017 encouraged the development of "actuarial
instruments or processes to identify offenders who present an unusu-
ally low risk to public safety."o6 0 One reason is that "[i]n virtually
every decision-making situation for which the issue has been studied,
it has been found that statistically developed predictive devices out-
perform human judgments."1 6 1 The science and data behind predicting
recidivism has improved in the past few decades, while traditional
clinical predictions have not.1 62 Going still further, the Model Penal
Code endorses evidence-based sentencing, stating that sentencing
commissions should "develop actuarial instruments or processes, sup-
ported by current and ongoing research, that will estimate the relative
154 See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 896-99 (1983).
155 Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 275 (1976) (plurality opinion).
156 Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 776 (2017).
157 See J.C. Oleson, Risk in Sentencing: Constitutionally Suspect Variables and Evidence-
Based Sentencing, 64 SMU L. REV. 1329, 1399-402 (2011); Monahan & Skeem, supra note 63, at
159-60.
158 See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.007 (West 2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 5120.114 (LexisNexis 2014); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 988.19 (2003); 42 PA. STAT. AND
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2154.7 (West 2016); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.500 (2016); Malenchik v.
State, 928 N.E.2d 564, 571-73 (Ind. 2010); State v. Gauthier, 939 A.2d 77, 81, 85-86 (Me. 2007)
(approving use of risk score in sentencing).
159 See ROGER K. WARREN, NAT'L INST. OF CORR., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Evidence-
Based Practice to Reduce Recidivism (2007), https://s3.amazonaws.com/static.nicic.gov/Library/
023358.pdf [https://perma.cc/KK8G-WT59]; see also PAMELA M. CASEY ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR
STATE COURTS, USING OFFENDER RISK AND NEEDS ASSESSMENT INFORMATION AT SENTENC-
ING (2011).
160 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.06(5) note on status of section (AM. LAW INST., Proposed
Final Draft 2017) (regarding sentencing).
161 Stephen D. Gottfredson & Don M. Gottfredson, Accuracy of Prediction Models, in
CRIMINAL CAREERS AND "CAREER CRIMINALS" 212, 247 (Alfred Blumstein et al. eds., 1986).
162 John Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk Assessment: Forecasting Harm Among Prison-
ers, Predators, and Patients, 92 VA. L. REV. 391, 406 (2006).
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risks that individual offenders pose to public safety" to be incorpo-
rated into sentencing guidelines, but only in order to grant more leni-
ent sentences to comparatively lower risk individuals.163 The Code
also calls for needs assessments to match offenders with rehabilitative
and treatment interventions.164
One concern is with the predictive accuracy of risk assessment.
For example, predicting more serious offenses is more challenging
than predicting low-risk offenders.1 65 The thresholds for categorizing
individuals as higher or lower risk themselves must be set and doing
so raises significant policy questions. A second concern is that risk
assessment may not make public the factors relied upon or how they
are weighted. The Model Penal Code recommends that risk-assess-
ment tools be reviewed for their reliability, and that they be consid-
ered at the discretion of the sentencing judge. 6 6 As a result, the
defendant can challenge the findings of an assessment "in open court"
and can "contest any adverse findings."167 Certain private software
used by judges, for example, apparently relies on, in addition to static
factors such as age and criminal history, socioeconomic and family fac-
tors.1 68 Such factors may strongly correlate with race.1 6 9
Thus, a related concern is with taking into account invidious fac-
tors, whether directly or indirectly. Sonja Starr has argued that explic-
itly taking gender into account also violates the Equal Protection
Clause.170 Others have countered that use of gender as a factor does
not raise constitutional concerns, because risk-assessment recommen-
dations are advisory, and because, as the Model Penal Code notes,
gender is highly predictive.171 Models may also take into account fac-
tors that are themselves highly correlated with race and ethnicity.1 7 2 In
163 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 6B.09(2) (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final Draft 2017) (re-
garding sentencing).
164 Id. § 6B.09(1).
165 Id. § 6B.09(1) note on section ("From an actuarial perspective, attempts to identify per-
sons of low recidivism risk are more often successful than attempts to identify persons who are
unusually dangerous."). See Richard Berk & Justin Bleich, Statistical Procedures for Forecasting
Criminal Behavior: A Comparative Assessment, 12 J. CRIMINOLOGY & Pua. POL'Y 513, 515
(2013).
166 See MODEL PENAL CODE: § 6B.09(1) (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final Draft 2017) (re-
garding sentencing).
167 Id. § 6B.09 note on section.
168 See Northpointe Software Suite, NORTHPOINTE, http://www.equivant.com/solutions/case-
management-for-supervision [https://perma.cc/U38Y-2W23].
169 See Monahan & Skeem, supra note 63.
170 See Starr, supra note 25, at 824.
171 See Monahan, supra note 162, at 431.
172 See Michael Marcus, Sentencing Support Tools: User Manual for Judges, SMART SENT'G
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the future, machine learning may be used so that a system adapts and
"learns" over time which information is more predictive, but there as
well, the concern that discrimination would result is important and
already the subject of policy debate.173
Jurisdictions can adopt transparent risk-assessment tools and vali-
date them over time. Perhaps the most prominent approach has been
adopted in Virginia, the first state to use an actuarial risk-assessment
tool to identify and divert low-risk offenders for drug and property
offenses, and the state sentencing commission has monitored and as-
sessed data on recidivism to improve the predictive quality of its mea-
sures. 17 4 However, recent work has shown that judges do not
consistently apply that risk assessment in sentencing, raising questions
regarding not just the design of risk assessment but also how well it is
used in practice by officials with discretion.175 Much more work needs
to be done to examine how officials make decisions using risk
assessment.
The use of risk assessment also raises questions concerning the
purposes of punishment. Scholars have argued that risk is a legitimate
consideration in sentencing, in part because it is also relevant to culpa-
bility and retribution; on a purely retrospective retributive approach,
however, forward-looking considerations of risk are not relevant.176
More broadly, this problem raises the question taken up in Part III:
What evidence should criminal justice interventions be based on, and
how should it be analyzed?
III. TOWARD AN EVIDENCE-INFORMED CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
Criminal justice has persistently lacked adequate data to inform
policy.17 7 Evidence cannot inform criminal justice if there is not good
evidence. Still worse, there is the concern with the quality of what
7, 10 (July 28, 2009), http://smartsentencing.com/2009%20judge%20instruction% 2 0manual.pdf
[https://perma.cc/86SJ-BLLU].
173 See Richard Berk & Jordan Hyatt, Machine Learning Forecasts of Risk to Inform Sen-
tencing Decisions, 27 FED. SENT'G REP. 222 (2015); Aziz Z. Huq, Racial Equity in Algorithmic
Criminal Justice, 68 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2019).
174 See BRIAN J. OSTROM ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS & VA. CRIMINAL SEN-
TENCING COMM'N, DOCUMENT No. 196815, OFFENDER RISK ASSESSMENT IN VIRGINIA: A
THREE-STAGE EVALUATION 25 (2002); 2010 VA. CRIM. SENT'G COMMISSION ANN. REP. 38-41.
175 See Garrett & Monahan, supra note 24; John Monahan, Anne Metz & Brandon L. Gar-
rett, Judicial Appraisals of Risk Assessment at Sentencing, 36 BEHAV. Sci. & L. (forthcoming
2018) (on file with the author).
176 See Monahan, supra note 162, at 392-93.
177 NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE 9
(Charles F. Wellford et al. eds., 2010).
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data is collected, including whether it is complete, consistent, too nar-
rowly focused, or outright biased.17 This Part will discuss persistent
concerns about whether empirical research on existing data is well de-
signed.17 9 An additional set of questions asks whether institutional ac-
tors appropriately implement these methods in practice. An evidence-
informed framework poses real challenges for criminal justice actors
used to relying on traditional discretion and methods.1s8 There can be
perverse distorting effects or biases to relying on seemingly neutral
data.s18 The challenges that this new revolution poses are that evi-
dence-informed approaches can lead to decisions based on what can
be quantified but neglecting patterns of bias that arise from factors
that are not quantified or transparent.1 82 Relatedly, the instruments or
methods may be of the type that judges, lawyers, and jurors do not
understand. Across each of these problem areas, the common prob-
lem is the interface between data and individual decisionmakers.
A. Inadequate Data Collection
A pervasive and persistent problem in criminal justice has been
lack of adequate data across local jurisdictions and a lack of adequate
research using sound designs to study these data.18 3 The National Re-
search Council issued a report in 2010 with sweeping recommenda-
tions for improving the federal role in researching criminal justice.184
One common criticism of those federally funded studies has been the
lack of experimental or quasi-experimental designs permitting evalua-
tion of outcomes.'85 A separate report assessing the Bureau of Justice
Statistics data collection noted the need for improved data collection,
but also noted the "general difficulty of measurement in the justice
system," particularly where state courts systems "vary strongly in their
accessibility and sophistication" of their data collection.1 86 The Bureau
has operated statistical analysis centers to assist with improved data
collection in criminal justice.1'8
178 See id.
179 See Weisburd et al., supra note 61, at 9.
180 See Roth, supra note 81, at 1289-90 (describing the challenge that an evidence-based
framework imposes by restraining judicial discretion).
181 See Ferguson, supra note 81, at 401-02.
182 See id.
183 See Klingele, supra note 80, at 558.
184 See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 177, at 3-8.
185 See id. at 78.
186 NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENSURING THE QUALITY, CREDIBILITY, AND RELEVANCE
OF U.S. JUSTICE STATISTICS 7 (Robert M. Groves & Daniel L. Cork eds., 2009).
187 Id. at 43.
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With inadequate data across jurisdictions, much of the research
has examined data from the particular jurisdictions that have been
willing to share that information with researchers.88 Such data may be
generalizable in some settings, but in other settings it may not. The
memory of an eyewitness is not different in Houston as compared
with Denver. The use of a stop-and-frisk policy, however, based on
police practices, neighborhood characteristics, and crime patterns,
may be quite different. The effectiveness of a drug treatment program
may be perfectly generalizable in theory but not in practice, if it relies
on local social services that differ across jurisdictions.
An additional concern in the criminal justice setting is that many
agencies that do collect data do not make it public or share it with
researchers. Police agencies may assess "hot spots" for purposes of
policing or review body-camera footage to supervise officers and
gather evidence, but they may not share these data with others. Police
agencies may be reluctant to permit randomized trials, as is done in
medicine, due to concerns about what the results might show, con-
cerns about feasibility, or ethical concerns about harm to the "pla-
cebo" population that receives a different type of criminal justice
"treatment."
These obstacles to research remain, but there is some progress
because of the pervasive interest in collecting and analyzing data, and
the accompanying need for researchers to assist in such analyses.
More police agencies now, for example, have in-house data specialists.
Federal funding through the Smart Policing Initiative has provided re-
sources and training for agencies to hire analysts and then fund studies
to assess the results. 89 There is now an International Association of
Crime Analysts.1 90 Private foundations have supported the creation of
labs to study law enforcement and other government data.' 9 ' That
said, unavailability of data and concerns with poor data collection re-
main endemic.
188 See id. at 150.
189 See Erin Richey, How Data Analysis Helps Police, FORBES (June 3, 2014, 3:22 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/emcl2014/06/03/data-analysis-helps-police-departments-fight-crime
[https://perma.cc/93GS-FXPN].
190 See What Crime Analysts Do, INT'L Ass'N CRIME ANALYSTS, https://www.iaca.net/dc-an
alyst-role.asp [https://perma.cc/S9SR-KHEQ].
191 The Lab @ DC is an example. See LAB @ DC, http://thelab.dc.gov [https://perma.cc/
E39A-3AZ9].
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B. Interdisciplinary Research and Systematic Reviews
A crucial safeguard against poorly designed or misinterpreted
studies or generalizing from results in one jurisdiction, or potentially
different conditions in another jurisdiction, is not just that the data
and methods be sound but that systematic reviews be conducted to
ensure consistency of results. Consistent and clear standards for con-
ducting studies enable systematic reviews and comparison of results,
which have been crucial in the evidence-based medicine context. 1 92
There is no criminal justice equivalent to the Cochrane Collaboration
or the other efforts put into systematic reviews in the medical con-
text.19 3 The Campbell Collaboration, an effort to encourage systematic
reviews in other contexts, has collected around a hundred criminal jus-
tice-related reviews.1 94
In areas in which systematic reviews have been conducted, they
have sometimes shed important light on general phenomena related
to criminal justice. For example, a federal review of studies concerning
death sentencing in the United States concluded that there was strong
evidence of racial bias in death sentencing.1 95 Another review of stud-
ies concerning deterrence concluded that there was no evidence, in
contrast, that the death penalty does or does not deter.1 96 Those stud-
ies may have at least influenced policy debates in the area. In the eye-
witness-memory area, several meta-analyses have been relied on by
courts and researchers in their assessments of what improvements are
needed to police lineup procedures.1 97 In general, outside limited ar-
eas like those examples, no such systemic reviews exist, much less sys-
temic reviews that meet standards of the Cochrane Collaboration.
Whether or not evidence-informed policy is generalizable outside
a jurisdiction, the uses of data can and should be tested. Empirical
approaches that rely on machine learning algorithms raise more chal-
lenging questions, since they adapt to data over time. Transparency, if
attainable, may not help to assess the quality of the machine decision-
making. Machine learning has the potential to advance the accuracy of
192 Weisburd et al., supra note 61, at 9 (advocating "clearer standards for reporting study
findings and ... recommending an approach to statistical testing that allows researchers to ex-
amine directly whether treatments achieve a minimal threshold of program success").
193 See id. at 6-7.
194 See CAMPBELL COLLABORATION, https://www.campbellcollaboration.org [https://perma
.cc/2GDX-4VYU].
195 See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEATH SENTENCING: RESEARCH INDICATES
PATTERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES (Feb. 26, 1990).
196 See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, DETERRENCE AND THE DEATH PENALTY 3 (2012).
197 See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACAD., supra note 21.
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a wide range of criminal justice decisions.198 Models should be tested,
and the data inputs should be evaluated, as well as the outputs. A new
literature and public debate has only begun to engage with challenges
that machine learning raises for criminal justice.
A still additional problem, discussed in Part II, is that many of the
problems studied and research needed are interdisciplinary in nature.
In medicine, systemic review methods form epidemiology-informed
research, alongside psychological insights and other scientific meth-
ods. Psychology and statistics, among other disciplines, have informed
wrongful convictions research. A randomized controlled trial may be
the best way to study one type of criminal justice intervention, while a
psychological study of judge or jury decisionmaking may be the best
way to study another. One strength of the 1967 President's Commis-
sion Report was that it recommended that a national institute or
center be created to house such an interdisciplinary research pro-
gram.199 The National Academy of Sciences has served an important
role to bring together researchers from different disciplines, along
with criminal-justice practitioners. The Report was correct that such
work should be institutionalized. So far it has not been.
C. Institutional Barriers
In his landmark article, The Pathological Politics of Criminal
Law, William Stuntz observed that though the tough-on-crime era
might have been starting to recede, if the same institutional power
dynamics persisted, then police and particularly prosecutors would
continue to dominate the practice of criminal justice in the United
States.2 0 0 Perhaps the evidence-informed turn in criminal justice has
only followed the same timeworn institutional grooves.201
The federal courts have largely been unreceptive to empirical re-
search regarding criminal justice. After all, the U.S. Supreme Court
has set out approaches indifferent to empirical findings, in areas rang-
ing from the death penalty, in its opinion in McCleskey v. Kemp;202 to
eyewitness identifications, in its failure to reconsider Manson v.
198 See generally RICHARD BERK, CRIMINAL JUSTICE FORECASTS OF RISK: A MACHINE
LEARNING APPROACH (2012).
199 See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENF'T & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 271.
200 See Stuntz, supra note 8, at 505, 510 ("The current tough-on-crime phase of our national
politics will someday end; indeed it seems to be ending already, as the current controversies over
the death penalty and racial profiling suggest.").
201 For an account of this phenomenon in the use of DNA technology, see generally Kerry
Abrams & Brandon L. Garrett, DNA and Distrust, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 757 (2015).
202 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
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Brathwaite;203 to policing, in its failure to regulate police use of force
or stop-and-frisk. 204 Tracey Meares and Bernard Harcourt have called
for "a new generation of criminal procedure jurisprudence, one that
places empirical and social scientific evidence at the very heart of con-
stitutional adjudication." 2 05 As described in Part II, that has not hap-
pened, for the most part, in the courts. Instead, a wide range of
criminal justice actors have adopted new practices that have outstrip-
ped constitutional criminal procedure. 206 Perhaps the courts will over
time further embrace scientific research in criminal justice. State
courts, as described in Part II, have done so in areas ranging from
eyewitness identification practices to the creation of alternative
courts. That said, courts should also carefully consider whether evi-
dence-informed practices threaten individual constitutional rights.
One concern is that existing evidence-informed interventions
have been limited in their scale, making them more difficult to assess
and of limited impact if successful. In the area of drug courts, for ex-
ample, the concern is that those defendants most receptive to treat-
ment may be referred to the courts, but those most in need of
rehabilitation may not be taken.207 More effective treatment may be
far more expensive. 2 0 8 Many reforms to prevent wrongful convictions
that have been broadly adopted have been inexpensive, such as chang-
ing lineup policies or videotaping interrogations.209 In contrast, more
expensive but less incremental reforms, like barring the use of coer-
cive interrogation techniques or creating agencies tasked with investi-
gations of claims of innocence, have rarely been seriously considered
in the United States. 210 Improving use of forensic evidence faces chal-
203 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
204 See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 317-18; Manson, 432 U.S. at 116; Brandon L. Garrett et al.,
The American Death Penalty Decline, 107 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 561, 608 (2017).
205 Meares & Harcourt, supra note 10, at 735.
206 James S. Liebman & David Mattern, Correcting Criminal Justice Through Collective
Experience Rigorously Examined, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 585, 599 (2014) (recommending an "itera-
tive and data-driven strategy" toward criminal justice).
207 Jessica M. Eaglin, Against Neorehabilitation, 66 SMU L. REV. 189, 213 (2013) (describ-
ing a concern that "drug courts frequently fail to address the offender populations most in need
of treatment" and a concern with a "cherry pick[ing]" mentality).
208 Christopher T. Lowenkamp et al., The Risk Principle in Action: What Have We Learned
from 13,676 Offenders and 97 Correctional Programs?, 51 CRIME & DELINQ. 1, 12-13 (2006).
209 See Policy Reform, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.org/policy
[https://perma.cc/EH87-5PZR].
210 See Conviction Integrity Units, Exonerations in 2016, NAT'L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS
1-2 (Mar. 2017), https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/CIUs%202016%20
Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/NR7D-B9SE].
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lenges in our "antiquated criminal justice system," as Erin Murphy
puts it.211
As the 2015 report critiquing the JRI states:
Some of the chief impediments to reducing the overuse of
state prison are the structural disincentives (financial and
risk) inherent in current law enforcement and corrections
systems. If localities seek to develop alternative approaches
to state prison, it is the localities which must bear the finan-
cial burden of establishing and maintaining those alterna-
tives, which discourages local innovation and reinforces the
easier and cheaper (to localities) option of prison, where the
state picks up the costs. 2 12
Changing power dynamics to focus on evidence over discretion may
also proceed slowly. Then again, conviction integrity units have spread
among prosecutors. Death sentencing has dramatically changed due to
actions by prosecutors.
Where criminal justice actors themselves generate the data
needed to assess criminal justice policy, there is the persistent concern
that policymakers can "fudge or nudge the science," as Meares and
Harcourt put it.213 Klingele warns of "the danger of overselling the
present state of knowledge." 214 Many have raised concerns over exac-
erbating racial bias, regarding predictive policing, sentencing, 215 and
risk-based approaches toward incarceration. 216 The hope is that
greater use of evidence can illuminate bias better than reliance on
traditional discretion; the danger is that new forms of bias will go
undetected.
One model for thinking more systematically about the relation-
ships between the different stages in the criminal justice process and
the different actors involved is the sequential intercept model used in
the mental health setting.217 This Essay has described evidence-in-
211 Erin Murphy, The Mismatch Between Twenty-First-Century Forensic Evidence and Our
Antiquated Criminal Justice System, 87 S. CAL. L. REv. 633, 633 (2014).
212 AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 84, at 10.
213 Meares & Harcourt, supra note 10, at 797.
214 Klingele, supra note 80, at 576.
215 See HARCOURT, supra note 25; Oleson, supra note 157, at 1395-98; Starr, supra note 25,
at 819.
216 See generally Eaglin, supra note 207, at 210-22.
217 Mark R. Munetz & Patricia A. Griffin, Use of the Sequential Intercept Model as an
Approach to Decriminalization of People with Serious Mental Illness, 57 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES
544, 544 (2006) ("The Sequential Intercept Model provides a conceptual framework for commu-
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formed interventions that variously have informed arrest practices,
criminal investigations, pretrial decisions, trial practice, and postcon-
viction remedies. In the mental health setting, the sequential intercept
model maps out how persons with mental illness should be identified
and intercepted early on, at the time of arrest or earlier, to prevent
them from entering deeper into the criminal justice system. The focus
is on crime prevention, diversion, and treatment, and the focus is sys-
temic, centering on each stage in the process to prevent individuals
from cycling through the criminal justice system. The same systematic
approach could animate criminal justice reforms more broadly.
CONCLUSION
The new turn toward evidence-informed criminal justice has not
yet realized the hopes of the drafters of the 1967 President's Commis-
sion Report. A centralized and independent scientific agency, like
those drafters called for, is still desperately needed. That said, there
has been a remarkable transformation in the direction of openness
and use of data to inform criminal justice policy. The growing effort to
use empirical data to inform the entire criminal justice process is am-
bitious and raises still larger questions, many of which do not yet have
good answers. We should not view objections to particular types of
evidence-informed interventions, like concerns about predictive polic-
ing or sentencing, in isolation. A more systematic approach, like the
sequential intercept model in mental health, is needed. A national
agency might coordinate such work, but none exists.
Going forward, policymakers and researchers can work toward
the goal of expanding the evidence base, as well as the use of more
systematic methods of analysis. There is a deep need to collect evi-
dence beyond the current interests of the chief institutional actors.
While police may want to maximize on arrests, they need to account
for direct and collateral costs of those arrests, disparities in patterns of
arrests, and outcomes of arrests. Prosecutors may want to maximize
felony convictions and sentences, but they should account for the ac-
curacy and quality of those convictions and sentences and the broader
costs that they impose. Systematic reviews will be particularly impor-
tant in our fragmented criminal justice system, where policies are
often adopted piecemeal. Interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary ap-
proaches are helpful in many research settings, and this is particularly
true in criminal justice research. A range of disciplines will offer im-
envisions a series of points of interception at which an intervention can be made to prevent
individuals from entering or penetrating deeper into the criminal justice system.").
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portant insights, including the use of economics to study costs and
benefits, psychological research to study behavior of criminal justice
actors, and medical research to study the efficacy of mental health and
drug-treatment interventions.
As data is collected more comprehensively, new questions will
arise regarding the interaction of evidence-informed practices with
each other. If risk-based instruments are used at sentencing, then we
must study how they interact with data-oriented approaches by the
police who choose whether to arrest offenders in the first instance.
Risk may be assessed-but we need much more information about
how risk of offending can be reduced through needs assessment and
rehabilitative programs. We must study whether rehabilitation pro-
grams magnify disparities in outcomes in sentencing or instead reduce
them. We must study whether forensic and other new technologies
distort whom police monitor and arrest, or how prosecutors choose to
prosecute. We must study how biases flowing from the police's or
prosecutor's feedback affect how that evidence is analyzed in the lab-
oratory. Such interactions are only beginning to be brought forward as
relevant concerns, much less the subject of research.
The evidence-informed criminal justice revolution is just begin-
ning. Time will tell whether the rise in the collection and use of crimi-
nal justice data puts us in a brave new world or a more just world.
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